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Abstract
Data augmentation by incorporating cheap unlabeled data from multiple domains is a pow-
erful way to improve prediction especially when there is limited labeled data. In this work, we
investigate how adversarial robustness can be enhanced by leveraging out-of-domain unlabeled
data. We demonstrate that for broad classes of distributions and classifiers, there exists a sam-
ple complexity gap between standard and robust classification. We quantify to what degree
this gap can be bridged via leveraging unlabeled samples from a shifted domain by providing
both upper and lower bounds. Moreover, we show settings where we achieve better adversarial
robustness when the unlabeled data come from a shifted domain rather than the same domain as
the labeled data. We also investigate how to leverage out-of-domain data when some structural
information, such as sparsity, is shared between labeled and unlabeled domains. Experimentally,
we augment two object recognition datasets (CIFAR-10 and SVHN) with easy to obtain and un-
labeled out-of-domain data and demonstrate substantial improvement in the model’s robustness
against `∞ adversarial attacks on the original domain.
1 Introduction
Robustness to adversarial attacks has been a major focus in machine learning security [4,12,26], and
has been intensively studied in the past few years [8,15,32]. However, the theoretical understanding
of adversarial robustness is still far from being satisfactory. Research [36] have demonstrated sample
complexity may be one of the obstacles in achieving high robustness under standard learning, which
is a large challenge since in many real-world applications, labeled examples are few and expensive.
To address this challenge, recent works [9, 37] showed that adversarial robustness can be improved
by leveraging unlabeled data that come from the same distribution/domain as the original labeled
training samples. Nevertheless, that is still limited due to the difficulty to make sure that the
unlabeled data are exactly from the same distribution as the labeled data. For example, gathering
a large number of unlabeled images that follow the same distribution as CIFAR-10 is challenging,
since one would have to carefully match the same lighting conditions, backgrounds, etc. Meanwhile,
out-of-domain unlabeled data can be much easier and cheaper to collect. For instance, we used
Bing search engine to query a small number of keywords and, within hours, generated a new 500k
dataset of noisy CIFAR-10 categories; we call this Cheap-10.
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In this paper, we investigate how such widely-available, out-of-domain unlabeled data could
improve robustness in the original domain. We analyze the behavior of standard and robust classi-
fication under a flexible generative model with Gaussian seeds and a non-linear classifier class. Our
model and classifier classes can be viewed as an extension of the Gaussian model and linear classifier
class proposed in [36]. We show in this more general setting, the sample complexity gap between
standard and robust classification still exists. That is, to achieve the same amount of accuracy, the
sample complexity of robust training is significantly larger than that of standard training. We also
demonstrate the necessity of this gap by providing a minimax type lower bound result. Luckily, we
show that using unlabeled out-of-domain data can substantially improve robust accuracy as long as
the unlabeled domain is not too different from the original domain or if they share some (unknown)
structural information, such as similar sparse features. Interestingly, we further show settings where
using out-of-domain unlabeled data can produce even better robust accuracy than using in-domain
unlabeled data.
We support our theory with experiments on two benchmark image recognition tasks, CIFAR-10
and SVHN, for empirical `∞ robustness and certified `2 robustness. In CIFAR-10, adding our easily
generated Cheap-10 unlabeled data produces substantially higher robust accuracy than using just
the CIFAR-10 data, and it achieves performance close to that of adding a much more expensive and
carefully curated set of 500k unlabeled images that come from the same domain as CIFAR-10. On
SVHN, we systematically characterize the tradeoff between the amount of noise in the unlabeled
data and the robustness gain from adding such data.
Related works. After the successful implementation of white-box and black-box adversarial
examples [4, 15, 29], several heuristic defense methods were introduced and broken one after an-
other [1–3, 7, 16, 39]. A line of work has focused on certified robustness [10, 11, 22, 24, 33] which
has appealing guarantees but has relatively limited empirical performance. Most recent efforts on
training empirically robust models is based on adversarial training [18, 20, 27, 41]. To explain why
it is difficult to achieve satisfactory performance in robust learning, some works try to explain the
obstacles to gain robustness in a perspective of computation cost [5, 14]. Other work such as [36]
try to explain the obstacle by showing the sample complexity of robust learning can be significantly
larger than that of standard learning. They investigated the Gaussian model, which is a special
case of our Gaussian generative model.
Some recent works [9, 37] propose using semi-supervised learning method, which has a rich
literature [21, 28, 35], to bridge that sample gap. Their theoretical results all assume the unlabeled
data are drawn from the same marginal distribution as the labeled data. We show that to bridge
the sample complexity gap, it is sufficient to have well-behaved unlabeled out-of-domain data. We
substantially extend the previous results to more general models and classifier classes and also make
the first step to quantify when and how unlabeled data coming from a shifted distribution can help in
improving adversarial robustness. Experimentally, previous works augmented CIFAR-10 with Tiny
images, which is curated and very similar to CIFAR-10. We introduce a new dataset Cheap-10 and
obtain comparable results and demonstrate the power of incorporating out-of-domain data. Other
related works include [40], which demonstrates a PCA-based procedure to incorporate unlabeled
data to gain robustness and [30], who consider combining distributional robust optimization and
semi-supervised learning.
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2 Set-up
Consider the classification task of mapping the input x ∈ X ⊆ Rs1 to the label y ∈ {±1}. We
have n labeled training data from an original domain D, with a joint distribution Px,y over (x, y)
pairs and marginal distribution Px over x. Meanwhile, we have another n˜ unlabeled samples from
a different domain D˜, with a distribution P˜x over x.
In this work, we focus on studying the possible advantages and limitations by performing semi-
supervised learning with data from D and D˜ to train a classifier for the domain D. Specifically, we
apply the pseudo-labeling approach used in [9] as follows. First, we perform supervised learning on
the labeled data from domain D to obtain a classifier f0. We then apply this classifier on D˜ and
generate pseudo-labels for the unlabeled data: {(x, f0(x))|x ∈ D˜}, which are further used to train
a final model. The classification error metrics we consider are defined as the following.
Definition 2.1 ((Robust) classification error). Let P be a distribution over X × {±1}. The clas-
sification error β of a classifier g : Rs1 7→ {±1} is defined as βg = P(x,y)∼P(g(x) 6= y) and robust
classification error βRg = P(x,y)∼P(∃u ∈ C(x) : g(u) 6= y), for some constraint set C.
Throughout the paper, we consider the constraint set C to be the `p-ball Bp(x, ε) := {u ∈
X |‖u − x‖p 6 ε} with p = ∞. In addition, we consider a certain type of data generating process
for domain D — the Gaussian generative model, which is frequently used in generative models in
machine learning. This model is more general than the one analyzed in [36], which only considered
symmetric Gaussian mixtures. Our Gaussian generative model takes a sample from a Gaussian
mixture as input, and then pass it through a nonlinear (possibly high-dimensional) mapping.
Gaussian generative model. For a function ρ : Rs1 7→ Rs2 , given z ∈ Rs1 , the samples from D
are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution over (x, y) ∈ Rs2 × {±1}, such that
x = ρ(yz) (1)
where z ∼ N (µ, σ2Is1), y ∼ Bern(12) for µ ∈ Rs1 , σ ∈ R.
Classifier class. The classifier class we consider in this paper is in the following form:
G = {g|g(x) = sgn(w>(ϑ(x)− b)), (w, b) ∈ Rd × Rd}, (2)
where ϑ is a basis function and ϑ : Rs2 7→ Rd. We remark here that this classifier class is more general
than the linear classifier class considered in [36]. For a broad class of kernels, by Mercer’s theorem,
the corresponding kernel classification belongs to G with a certain basis function ϑ. Throughout
the paper, we use θ = (w, b) to denote the parameters.
Remark 2.1. The Gaussian generative model and the classifier class we considered in this paper
forms a hierarchy structure, where a random seed z ∈ Rs1 is mapped by a generative function ρ to
the input space x ∈ Rs2, and it is further mapped to Rd by ϑ(x) when implementing classification.
Notation and terminolgy. We let φ = ϑ ◦ ρ and denote fw,b(x) = sgn(w>(ϑ(x) − b)). In
Section 3, the results will be mainly described in terms of φ. Besides, let β(w, b) = P(x,y)∼P(fw,b(x) 6=
y) and βR(w, b) = P(x,y)∼P(∃u ∈ C(x) : fw,b(u) 6= y) for a constraint set C. In particular, we use
βε,∞ when C is the `∞-ball with radius ε. We use . for 6 up to a constant, i.e. a . b means
a 6 const · b, and use & for > up to a constant. We use  for = up to a constant. Meanwhile, we
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use ‖ · ‖ψ2 for sub-gaussian norm1. We call the conditional distribution of x on y = 1 as positive
distribution while for y = −1 as negative distribution. For distribution P1 and P2 over x, we call a
distribution P over x is a uniform mixture of P1 and P2 if it equals to P1 and P2 with probability
1/2 respectively.
3 Theoretical Results
We demonstrate for Gaussian generative models that combining unlabeled data from a reasonably
well-behaved shifted domain leads to a classifier with better robust accuracy on the original domain
D compared to the achievable robust accuracy using only the labeled data from D. We further
analyze the tradeoff between how different the shifted domain can be from D before the unlabeled
data hurts the robust accuracy on D. Finally, we show that if the data from a shifted domain share
certain unknown sparsity structure with the data from original domain, performing semi-supervised
learning also helps in obtaining a classifier of higher robust accuracy on the original domain.
Assumptions. Throughout this section, our theories are based on the following assumptions
unless we state otherwise explicitly. 1). ϑ(·) is L1-Lipchitz continuous in `2-norm, i.e. ‖ϑ(a) −
ϑ(b)‖ 6 L1‖a− b‖, and L′1-Lipchitz continuous in `∞-norm; 2). ρ(·) is L2-Lipchitz continuous in `2-
norm and L′2-Lipchitz continuous in `∞-norm; 3). ‖Eφ(z)− Eφ(−z)‖ = 2α
√
d for z ∼ N (µ, σ2Is1)
and some constant α > 0. The last condition on the magnitude of the separation is added for the
simplicity of presentation. Such a magnitude choice is also used in [9, 36].
3.1 Supervised learning in Gaussian generative models
We first consider the supervised setting where only the labeled data are used. In this setting, we
prove the following two theorems demonstrating the sample complexity gap when one considers
standard error and robust error respectively. Analogous results for Gaussian mixture models was
shown in [36]; our results cover the more general Gaussian generative model setting.
Supervised learning algorithm: in this section, for the simplicity of presentation, we use 2n to
denote the size of labeled training data. For Gaussian generative models, we focus on the following
method. We first estimate w and b by wˆ = 1/n
∑n
i=1 yiϑ(xi) and bˆ = 1/n
∑2n
i=n+1 ϑ(xi). The final
classifier is then constructed as fwˆ,bˆ(x) = sgn(wˆ
>(ϑ(x) − bˆ)). Here half of the labeled data, n,
is used to fit wˆ and the other half used to fit bˆ, so that their estimation errors are independent,
which simplifies the analysis. The following theorem shows that this method achieves high standard
accuracy.
Theorem 3.1 (Standard accuracy). For a Gaussian generative model with σ . d1/4, the method
described above obtains a classifier fwˆ,bˆ such that for d sufficiently large, with high probability, the
classification error β(wˆ, bˆ) is at most 1% even with n = 1.
Meanwhile, we have the following lower bound to show the essentiality of the increased sample
complexity if we are interested in the robust error.
Theorem 3.2 (Sample complexity gap for robust accuracy). Let An be any learning algorithm, i.e.
a function from n samples to a binary classifier gn. Let σ  d1/4, ε > 0, and µ ∈ Rs1 be drawn from
1Due to the limit of space, we present the rigorous definition of the sub-gaussian norm in the appendix.
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a prior distribution N (0, Is1). We draw 2n samples from (µ, σ)-Gaussian generative model. Then,
the expected robust classification error βε,∞gn is at least (1− 1/d)/2 if
n . ε
2
√
d
log d
.
Taken together, these two Theorems demonstrate that a substantial larger number of labeled
samples (from the same domain) are necessary in order to achieve a decent robust accuracy in that
domain.
3.2 Improving learning via out-of-domain data
We next investigate how to improve the robust accuracy of a classifier via incorporating unlabeled
out-of-domain data.
Semi-supervised learning on out-of-domain data. Let us denote the samples from the shifted
domain as {x˜i}2n˜i=1, which is incorporated via the following semi-supervised learning algorithm.
Semi-supervised learning algorithm: we use wˆ and bˆ obtained in supervised learning to label
{x˜i}2n˜i=1 via gˆ(x) = sgn
(
wˆ>(ϑ(x) − bˆ) and obtain the corresponding pseudo-labels {y˜i}2n˜i=1. We
denote sample sizes for each label class by n˜1 =
∑2n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1) and n˜2 =
∑2n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = −1)
respectively. Then we estimate w and b respectively by w˜ = 1/2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
ϑ(x˜i)−1/2n˜2
∑n˜
y˜i=−1 ϑ(x˜i)
and b˜ = 1/2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
ϑ(x˜i) + 1/2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1 ϑ(x˜i). Given the pseudo-labels, these two estimators
only depend on the shifted domain data. They are slightly different than those in the supervised
setting, since the shifted domain data is not necessarily mixed uniformly. The classifier is then
constructed as fw˜,b˜(x) = sgn(w˜
>(ϑ(x) − b˜)). For the simplicity of theoretical analysis, we don’t
merge the original and out-of-domain datasets to get w˜ and b˜. However, as we show in Section 4,
merging both datasets for robust training lead to better empirical performance.
Recall φ = ϑ ◦ ρ, and the semi-supervised learning algorithm only involves y and ϑ(x), we
can equivalently view the input distribution as φ(yz) for z ∼ N (0, Is1), y ∼ Bern(1/2), and the
classifier class as G′ = {g|g(x) = sgn(w>x − b)), (w, b) ∈ Rd × Rd} (such linearization is the
common purpose of kernel tricks). For the simplicity of description, our later statements will use
this equivalent setting and simply consider the distributions of ϑ(x˜).
Theorem 3.3 (Robust accuracy). Recall in Gaussian generative model, the marginal distribution
of the input x of labeled domain is a uniform mixture of two distributions with mean µ1 = E[φ(z)]
and µ2 = E[φ(−z)] respectively, where z ∼ N (0, σ2Is1). Suppose the marginal distribution of the
input of unlabeled domain is a mixture of two sub-gaussian distributions with mean µ˜1 and µ˜2 with
mixing probabilities q and 1 − q and ∥∥E [ϑ(x˜i)− E[ϑ(x˜i)] | aTϑ(x˜i) = b]∥∥ . √d + |b| for fixed unit
vector a. Assuming the sub-gaussian norm for both labeled and unlabeled data are upper bounded by
a universal quantity σmax  d1/4, ‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖2 
√
d, c < q < 1− c for some constant 0 < c < 1/2,
and
dν = max
{‖µ˜1 − µ1‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ ,
‖µ˜2 − µ2‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖
}
< c0,
for some constant c0 ≤ 1/4, then the robust classification error is at most 1% when d is suffciently
large, n ≥ C for some constant C (not depending on d and ) and
n˜ & ε2 log d
√
d.
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We remark here that σmax, the upper bound of the sub-gaussian norm of the Gaussian generative
model, is upper bounded by L1L2σ. Comparing to the Theorem 3.2, which shows that the sample
complexity of order ε2
√
d/log d is necessary to achieve small robust error, the above theorem shows
that, by incorporating the same order of similar unlabeled data (up to a logarithm factor), which
is generally cheaper, one can achieve the same robust accuracy.
Connections to statistical measures. A key quantity in Theorem 3.3 is dν , which quantifies the
difference between the labeled and unlabeled domain. In this section, we make connections between
some commonly used statistical measures and dν via some more specific examples.We establish
connections to Wasserstein Distance, Maximal Information and H-Divergence. Due to the limit of
space, we only demonstrate the result for Wasserstein Distance here and put the other results in
the appendix. Throughout this paragraph, we consider the distribution of the labeled domain with
positive distribution P1, negative distribution P2, and y ∼ Bern(1/2). The marginal distributions
of shifted domain is assumed to be a uniform mixtures of P˜1 and P˜2.
Wasserstein Distance: the Wasserstein Distance induced by metric ρ between distributions P1
and P2 over Rd is defined as
Wρ(P1,P2) = sup
‖f‖Lip61
[∫
fdP1 − fdP2
]
,
where ‖f‖Lip 6 1 indicates the class of f : Rd 7→ R such that for any x, x′ ∈ Rd, |f(x) − f(x)| 6
ρ(x, x′). Let us consider ρ(x, x′) = ‖x− x′‖.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose max{Wρ(P1, P˜1),Wρ(P2, P˜2)} 6 τ , for τ > 0, then we have ‖µi− µ˜i‖ 6
τ for i = 1, 2. As a result,
dν 6
τ
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ .
If we further have τ 6 ‖µ1 − µ2‖/2, we will then have dν 6 τ/(‖µ1 − µ2‖ − 2τ).
As we can see, when the Wasserstein distance get smaller, the quantity dν decreases.
Data from a shifted domain can work even better. Theorem 3.3 demonstrates the sample
complexity gap in Section 3.1 can be bridged via out-of-domain data. Next, we show that in certain
settings, one can achieve even better adversarial robustness when the unlabeled data comes from a
shifted domain rather than the same domain as the labeled data. To illustrate this phenomenon,
let us analyze a specific example of our model — the Gaussian model proposed in [36].
Theorem 3.4. Suppose the distribution of the labeled domain has positive distribution N (µ, σ2Id)
and negative distribution N (−µ, σ2Id) with µ ∈ Rd and y ∼ Bern(1/2). Samples (x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)
are i.i.d. drawn from the labeled domain. Suppose we have unlabeled inputs from the same domain
xn+1, · · · , xn+n˜, and also have unlabeled shifted domain inputs x˜1, · · · , x˜n˜, which are drawn from a
uniform mixture of N (µ˜, σ2Id) and N (−µ˜, σ2Id) with µ˜ ∈ Rd. Denote the parameter θ = (w, b) of
the classifier obtained through semi-supervised algorithm by θˆsame and θˆshifted, when we use {xi}n+n˜i=n+1
and {x˜i} respectively. If we let assume minj µj ≥  and let µ˜ = µ−ε1d, where 1d is a d-dimensional
vector with every entry equals to 1, when (1/d+ 1/n˜) · σ2/2 → 0 as d, n˜→∞, we then have
βε,∞(θˆshifted) ≤ βε,∞(θˆsame).
This seemingly surprising result can be explained intuitively. Heuristically, when one tries
to minimize the robust error, the robust optimizer will be a regularized version of the standard
optimizer. In our semi-supervised setting, the shifted domain data also act as regularization. This
intuition is rigorously justified in the proof. Readers can find corresponding simulation results in
the appendix.
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Too irrelevant unlabeled data hurts robustness. In the results above, we demonstrate that
incorporating unlabeled data from a shifted domain can improve robust accuracy in the original
domain, if the shifted domain is not too different from the original (as measured by dν). Here
we show that there is no free lunch; if the shifted domain is too different from the original, then
incorporating its unlabeled data through pseudo-labeling could decrease the robust accuracy in the
original domain.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that the distribution of labeled domain’s positive and negative distribution
area uniform two symmetric sub-gaussian distribution with means µ2 = −µ1, and y ∼ Bern(1/2).
The distribution of unlabeled domain P ′ is a mixture of two sub-gaussian distributions with mean µ˜1
and µ˜2. Let Ξ = {µ˜1, µ˜2 : dν ≥ 12}. Then for P ′ with (µ˜1, µ˜2) ∈ Ξ, with high probability, the worst
case robust misclassification error βε,∞(w˜, b˜) via the previous semi-supervised learning satisfies
sup
P ′:(µ˜1,µ˜2)∈Ξ
βε,∞(w˜, b˜) ≥ 49%.
Shifted domain with unknown sparsity. In Theorem 3.3, we show how reasonably close shifted
domain data helps in improving adversarial robustness. However, sometimes, the shifted domain
is not so close to the original domain in terms of dν , but they still share some similarity. For
instance, both domains can share some structural commonness. Here, we consider the case where
the two distributions have common salient feature set; that is, the labeled and unlabeled domains
share discriminant features, though the corresponding coefficients can be far apart. This setting is
common in practice. For example, when one tries to classify images of different kinds of cats, the
discriminant features include the eyes, ears, shapes etc. These discriminant features also applies
when one aims to classify dogs, though the weights on these features might be very different.
Specifically, we consider the distributions of the labeled domain’s positive and negative parts
are N (µ1, σ2Id) and N (µ2, σ2Id), and the labels y ∼ Bern(1/2). The samples (x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)
are drawn i.i.d. from this labeled domain. Suppose we have unlabeled samples x˜1, ..., x˜n˜, which are
drawn from a uniform mixture of N (µ˜, σ2Id) and N (−µ˜, σ2Id) with µ˜ ∈ Rd. Here, we assume the
two domains share the support information, that is, supp(µ1 − µ2) = supp(µ˜1 − µ˜2), though the
distance between µ1 − µ2 and µ˜1 − µ˜2 is not necessarily small. For such a case, we propose to use
the following algorithm to help improving adversarial robustness.
Algorithm of unknown sparsity: we first apply the high-dimensional EM algorithm [6] to estimate
supp(µ˜1 − µ˜2) from the unlabeled data. This high-dimensional EM algorithm is an extension of
the traditional EM algorithm with the M-step being replaced by a regularized maximization. The
detailed description can be found in the Appendix. After implementing the high-dimensional EM
to estimate the support Sˆ from the unlabeled data, we then project the labeled data to this support
Sˆ and therefore reduce the dimension. Finally, we apply the algorithm in the supervised setting on
the labeled samples with reduced dimensionality to get the estimated wˆsparse = 1/n
∑n
i=1 yi[ϑ(xi)]Sˆ
and bˆsparse = 1/n
∑2n
i=n+1[ϑ(xi)]Sˆ . The following theorem provides theoretical guarantee for the
robust classification error for θˆsparse by this algorithm.
Theorem 3.6. Under the conditions of Theorem 3.3 on parameters µ1, µ2, µ˜1, µ˜2, σ and q. Suppose
| supp(µ1 − µ2)| = | supp(µ˜1 − µ˜2)| = m, and minµ˜1,j−µ˜2j 6=0 |µ˜1j − µ˜2,j | ≥ σ
√
2m log d/n˜, where µ˜i,j
is the j-th entry in vector µ˜i. If n & ε2 log d
√
m, we have
βε,∞(wˆsparse, bˆsparse) ≤ 10−3 +OP ( 1
n
+
1
d
).
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Comparing to the result in Theorem 3.2, which shows that the sample complexityO(ε2
√
d/(log d))
is necessary to achieve small robust error, the above theorem suggests that by utilizing the shared
structural information from the unlabeled domain, one can reduce the sample complexity from
O(
√
d) to O(
√
m). Corresponding simulation results are put in the Appendix.
4 Experiments
In this section, we provide empirical support for our theory and show that using unlabeled data from
shifted domains can consistently improve robust accuracy for two widely-used benchmark datasets:
CIFAR-10 [19] and SVHN [31].
Datasets. The CIFAR-10 dataset has a training set of 50k images and test set of 10k images. We
will use and compare three datasets as our sources of unlabeled data: 1) The 500k-TI dataset [9]
that is very similar to the CIFAR-10 dataset (500k images). It will be our benchmark for using
unlabeled data that is essentially from the original CIFAR-10 domain. 2) CINIC10 dataset [13],
which is a subset of ImageNet [34] of objects that are similar to CIFAR-10 objects (260k images)2.
CINIC10 is out-of-domain compared to CIFAR-10. 3) The Cheap-10 dataset that we created to be
a benchmark for using very cheap unlabeled out-of-domain data. We created Cheap-10 by searching
keywords related to CIFAR-10 objects on the Bing image search engine3. A more detailed pipeline
for creating Cheap-10 is described the appendix. The SVHN dataset had 73k training and 26k test
images. For SVHN task, the original dataset contains an extra 513k set of training images. We use
this extra images as our source of unlabeled data and synthetically push the data out of domain by
adding random Gaussian noise to it.
Methods. For each task, we first train a classification model on the original labeled data using
cross-entropy loss function. We then use the trained model to assign pseudo-labels to unlabeled
images. We next aggregate the two datasets to train a robust model using robust training. Follow-
ing [9], we sample half of each batch from the original data and the other half from the additional
pseudo-labeled data during training. We use the robustness regularization loss introduced in [41].
For a maximum allowed p-norm perturbation of size , we use the training loss function:
L (x, y; θ) = − log pθ(y|x) + β max
xˆ∈Bp(x,ε)
DKL(pθ(y|x)||pθ(yˆ|xˆ))
where the regularization parameter β balances the loss between accurate classification and stability
within the ε `p-norm ball. We approximate the maximization in the second term as follows:
• Similar to [27], for `∞ perturbations, we focus on empirical robustness of the models and use
an inner loop of projected gradient descent for the maximization.
• Following [9], for `2 perturbations, we focus on certified robustness and use the idea of
stability training [23, 42]. We replace the maximization with large additive noise draws:
Exˆ∼N (,σ)DKL(pθ(y|x)||pθ(yˆ|xˆ)). The idea is to have a model that is robust to large ran-
dom perturbations. Using Cohen et al.’s method [11], in test time, we can find a safe radius
of certified robust prediction for each sample.
2After removing CIFAR-10 test images that are in CINIC10
3https://www.bing.com/images/
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CIFAR-10 experiments. We used a Wide ResNet 28-10 architecture [38]. Following the lit-
erature, for `∞ perturbation, we set ε = 8/255. For stability training, we used σ = 0.25. More
implementation details are described in the Appendix. We first train a model on the original
CIFAR-10 training data (normal training) that yields a test accuracy of 96.1%. We use this model
to create pseudo-labels for our three unlabeled datasets. We can use the accuracy of the model on
our three datasets’ original labels to have a better idea of domain distances. The accuracy is 97%
on 500k-TI–similar to CIFAR-10 test accuracy. This validates the assumption that this dataset is
from the same domain as CIFAR-10. On the other hand, the accuracies on CINIC-10 and Cheap-10
are 75% and 67.9% respectively; confirming that these two datasets are out of domain.
Results for empirical robustness against l∞ perturbations are shown in Fig. 1(a). The clean
accuracy is the model’s performance on non-perturbed images. The robust accuracy is the model’s
performance on adversarially perturbed images. We use the strongest known adversarial attack
methods, iterative projected gradient descent (PGD), to create the l∞ perturbations. More details
are provided in the appendix. We find that using CINIC-10 and Cheap-10 datasets consistently
improves the robust accuracy and gives very close results to that of 500k-TI, supporting our theory.
It’s especially promising that simply adding our noisy Cheap-10 data, which we created in a few
hours, produced significantly better robust accuracy (59.4%) compared to the best existing defenses
using just CIFAR-10: TRADES method (55.4%, [41]) and Adversarial Pretraining (57.4%, [18]).
Results for certified robustness against `2 perturbations are shown in Fig. 1(b). The figure shows the
percentage of images that are certified to be classified correctly at each `2 radius. It demonstrates
that adding out-of-domain data consistently improves certified robustness compared to only using
the original training set. Using unlabeled data from the same domain (500k-TI) achieves the best
performance; though out-of-domain data is much cheaper and may be the only option is many
applications.
SVHN experiments We use a Wide ResNet 16-8 as our model architecture. SVHN has a training
set of 73k real digit images and an extended set of 531k images that come with the dataset. The
extra set is a synthetically generated set of digits that to mimic the original dataset closely. We
use the extended set as our source of unlabeled data. The model we trained (normal training) on
the original training set has an accuracy of 96.8% on SVHN test set and an accuracy of 98.4% on
the extra training set; this means that the extra data is very similar to the original SVHN dataset.
To push the unlabeled data out-of-domain, we add four different levels of additive Gaussian noise
to the images. We focus on `∞ perturbations with  = 4/255. Fig. 1 describes the results. The
dashed lines show clean and robust accuracies when only the original training set is used. It can be
observed that adding the unlabeled data robustly improves robust accuracy up to a certain level of
additive noise (σ = 0.1). As the unlabeled data distribution gets more distant from SVHN data,
the improvement achieved from adding the extra set of unlabeled images becomes smaller.
5 Further Discussions
Incorporating cheap unlabeled data is a popular way to improve the prediction performance in
machine learning. In this work, we show that this substantially improves adversarial robustness,
even when the unlabeled data come from a different domain.
One possible extension of our work is to consider a more general data distribution, such as
non-uniform mixture and subgaussianity of the labeled data distribution. Such an extension will
make the results applied to more settings. Further, our theoretical results and analysis also lay the
foundation of studying the adversarial robustness of other tasks, such as multi-class classification
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(a) (b)
Datasets
(# of samples)
Robust
Acc.
(%)
Clan
Acc. 
(%)
CIFAR10(50k) + 500k-TI(500k) 62.4 89.7
CIFAR10(50k) + CINIC-10(260k) + Cheap-10 (470k) 59.6 87.7
CIFAR-10(50k) + Cheap-10(470k) 59.4 87.5
CIFAR-10(50k) + CINIC-10(260k) 59.2 88.1
CIFAR-10(50k) 48.4 85.2
CIFAR-10(50k) (No adversarial training) 0.0 96.1
(c)
Figure 1: (a) `∞ robustness Each row shows the CIFAR-10 test accuracy on clean and adversarially
perturbed images ( = 8/255) when different datasets are added as unlabeled source of data. The
performance when we use the two out-of-domain datasets is consistently better than the original
training set and close to using the dataset from the same domain (500k-TI). (b) `2 certified
robustness Each point in the plot shows the percentage of CIFAR-10 test images that are certified
to be classified correctly at that `2 radius. Adding out-of-domain datasets consistently improves the
certified raidii. (c) SVHN dataset Dashed lines stand for the baseline performance of using only
the labeled data. Each point on the x-axis shows a different model that is robustly trained using
the original data and the unlabeled set of images with additive Gaussian noise with std (σ) equal
to the axis value. The dashed lines indicate the clean and robust accuracy achieved using only the
SVHN data.
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and regression in the semi-supervised setting when the unlabeled data come from a different domain.
The focus of this work is on the effects of out-of-domain unlabeled data, and we use the popular
and simple pseudo-labeling method to capture the key insights. An interesting direction of future
work is to investigate how to improve robustness with other semi-supervised learning methods. For
example, one could apply several iteration of pseudo-labeling to improve label quality.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Notation
We begin with notations. For a random variable X, its sub-gaussian norm/Orlicz norm is defined
as ‖X‖ψ2 = inf{t > 0 : E[eX
2/t2 ] ≤ 1}. For a d-dimensional random vector Y , the sub-gaussian
norm of Y is defined as ‖Y ‖ψ2 = supv∈Sd−1 ‖〈Y, v〉‖, where Sd−1 denotes the sphere of a unit ball
in Rd. For two sequences of positive numbers an and bn, an . bn means that for some constant
c > 0, an 6 cbn for all n, and an  bn if an . bn and bn . an. Further, we use the notion op and
Op, where for a sequence of random variables Xn, Xn = op(an) means Xn/an → 0 in probability,
Xn = Op(bn) means that for any ε > 0, there is a constant K, such that P(|Xn| ≤ K · bn) ≥ 1− ε,
and Xn = Ωp(bn) means that for any ε > 0, there is a constantK, such that P(|Xn| ≥ K ·bn) ≥ 1−ε.
Finally, we use c0, c1, c2, C1, C2, . . . to denote generic positive constants that may vary from place
to place.
Besides, let L = L1L2, then φ(·) is L1L2-Lipchitz in `2-norm.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We firstly consider to prove a bound for
P
(∥∥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(zi)− Eφ(z)
∥∥ > t),
where zi ∼ N (µ, σ2I).
Lemma A.1. There exists a universal constant c, such that
P
(∥∥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(zi)− Eφ(z)
∥∥ > cσ( √dL˜√
n/2
+ L
√
2 log(2/δ)
n
))
6 δ.
From the above inequality, we can immediately obtain
P
(∥∥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(zi)
∥∥ > ∥∥Eφ(z)∥∥+ cσ( √dL˜√
n/2
+ L
√
2 log(2/δ)
n
))
6 δ.
Remark A.1. Note that the concentration bound still holds for yφ(yz) and φ(yz) by simply applying
conditional probability.
Proof. Let ϑu(z) = 〈φ(z)− Eφ(z), u
〉
P
(∥∥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(zi)− Eφ(z)
∥∥ > t) = P( sup
‖u‖=1
〈 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(zi)− Eφ(z), u
〉
> t
)
= P
(
sup
‖u‖=1
1
n
n∑
i=1
ϑu(zi) > t
)
6 P
(
sup
u,u′∈B(0,1)
∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ϑu(zi)−
n∑
i=1
ϑu′(zi)
∣∣ > t)
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Let us use chaining and Orlicz-processes to obtain a bound. We prove { 1n
∑n
i=1 ϑu(zi), u ∈ B(0, 1)}
is a ϑ2-process with respect to a rescaled distance ‖ · ‖/λ for some λ > 0. If so, we will have
E exp
(λ2| 1n∑ni=1 ϑu(zi)− 1n∑ni=1 ϑu′(zi)|2
‖u− u′‖2
)
6 2.
The LHS
E exp
(λ2| 1n∑ni=1 ϑu(zi)− 1n∑ni=1 ϑu′(zi)|2
‖u− u′‖2
)
6
∫ ∞
0
etP
( | 1n∑ni=1 ϑu(zi)− 1n∑ni=1 ϑu′(zi)|
‖u− u′‖ >
√
t
λ
)
dt
6
∫ ∞
0
et2 exp
(− tn
λ2σ2L2
)
dt.
As long as
tn
λ2σ2L2
> 2, i.e. λ 6
√
n/2
σL
,
we would obtain the Dudley entropy integral as
J(D) =
1
λ
∫ 1
0
√
log(1 + exp(d log
1
δ
))dδ ≈ const ·
√
d
λ
.
We let λ =
√
n/2/(σL), it gives us J(D) = (σL˜)/
√
n/2, where L˜ = const · L.
Next, let us consider bounding
P
(
wˆ>(φ(z)− bˆ) 6 0) = P( wˆ>‖wˆ‖(φ(z)− bˆ) 6 0). (notice wˆ = 0 is of zero probability)
We further denote νw =
[
Eφ(z+i )− Eφ(z−i )
]
/2, νb =
[
Eφ(z+i ) + Eφ(z
−
i )
]
/2 and
γ = cσ
( √dL˜√
n/2
+ L
√
2 log(2/δ)
n
)
.
From Lemma A.1, we can obtain
P
(∣∣‖wˆ − νw‖∣∣ > γ) 6 δ,
P
(
‖bˆ− νb‖ > γ
)
6 δ.
Notice that for any unit vector v, v>(φ(z) − bˆ) is a σL-Lipschitz function of (z>, z>1 , · · · , z>n )> ∼
N (0, I(n+1)m), by standard concentration, we have the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. For any t > 0 and unit vector v
P
(
|v>(φ(z)− bˆ)− v>νw| > t
)
6 2 exp(− t
2
2σ2L2
).
Next, we provide a bound for 〈wˆ, νw〉.
Lemma A.3. For any t > 0
P
(|〈wˆ, νw〉 − ‖νw‖2| > t) 6 2 exp( −nt2
2σ2L2‖νw‖2 )
Taking δ = 2 exp( −nt
2
2σ2L2‖νw‖2 ), we have
P
(|〈wˆ, νw〉 − ‖νw‖2| > σL‖νw‖√2 log(2/δ)
n
)
6 δ
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Proof. LHS is equivalent to
P
(|〈wˆ − νw, νw〉| > t).
Besides, we have 〈wˆ − νw, νw/‖νw‖〉 = 1n
∑n
i=1〈yiφ(yizi) − νw, νw/‖νw‖〉 is a sum of sub-gaussian
variables with constant σL, then by sub-gaussian tail bound we have
P
(|〈wˆ − νw, νw〉| > t) 6 2 exp( −nt2
2σ2L2‖νw‖2 ).
[Proof of Theorem 3.1] If we denoteE = A∪B, whereA =
{
|〈wˆ, νw〉−‖νw‖2| 6 σL‖νw‖
√
2 log(2/δ1)
n
}
,
B = {|‖wˆ − νw‖
∣∣ 6 γ}, then with probability P(E), we have for t > 0
P
( wˆ>
‖wˆ‖(φ(z)− bˆ) 6 0
∣∣∣E) 6 P( wˆ>νw‖νw‖+ γ 6 t
∣∣∣E)+ 2 exp(− t2
2σ2L2
).
As long as we choose γ and t such that
wˆ>νw
‖νw‖+ γ > t
we have
P
( wˆ>
‖wˆ‖(φ(z)− bˆ) 6 0
∣∣∣E) 6 2 exp(− t2
2σ2L2
).
We take
δ = 2 exp(−(L˜/L)2d), δ1 = 2 exp(− d
8σ2L2
)
then
γ = 2
√
2cσL˜
√
d
n
.
As a result, we obtain
|〈wˆ, νw〉 − ‖νw‖2| 6 d
2
√
n
, |‖wˆ − νw‖
∣∣ 6 γ
with probability at least 1− δ1 − δ.
We can choose
t =
√
d(
√
n− 1/2)√
n+ 2
√
2cσL˜
,
so that
P
( wˆ>
‖wˆ‖(φ(z)− bˆ) 6 0
∣∣∣E) 6 2 exp( −d(√n− 1/2)2
2σ2L2(
√
n+ 2
√
2cσL˜)2
)
.
Thusly,
P
(
β(wˆ, bˆ) > 2 exp
( −d(√n− 1/2)2
2σ2L2(
√
n+ 2
√
2cσL˜)2
))
6 P(Ec),
which gives us the final result stated in the theorem.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Since we know ϑ is L′2-Lipchitz continuous in `∞-norm. Then, we know
P(x,y)∼P [∃u ∈ Bp(x, ε) :
〈
wˆ, y·(ϑ(u)−bˆ)〉 6 0] > P(zy,y)∼P ′ [∃u ∈ Bp(yz, ε/L′2) : 〈wˆ, y·(φ(u)−bˆ)〉 6 0]
since the pre-image of bBp(x, ε) via ϑ includes the set Bp(yz, ε/L′2). Then following the argument
in [36], the result follows.
Remark A.2. As a side interest, we also provide an analysis to show the lower bound result in
Theorem 3.2 is achievable up to a logarithm factor, by purely using labeled data. This scale matches
the result in [36], but under a more general model considered in our paper.
P(x,y)∼P [∃u ∈ Bp(x, ε) : fwˆ,bˆ(u) 6= y] = P(x,y)∼P [∃u ∈ Bp(x, ε) :
〈
wˆ, y · (ϑ(u)− bˆ)〉 6 0]
= P(x,y)∼P [∃η ∈ Bp(0, ε) :
〈
wˆ, y · (ϑ(x+ η)− bˆ)〉 6 0]
6 P(x,y)∼P [
〈
wˆ, (φ(z)− bˆ)〉+ min
η∈Bp(0,ε)
〈ηL1, wˆ〉 6 0]
= P(x,y)∼P [
〈
wˆ, (φ(z)− bˆ)〉 6 εL1‖wˆ‖q]
where 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
When p = ∞, q = 1, it leads to ‖wˆ‖1/‖wˆ‖ 6
√
d. Recall in Theorem 3.1, E = A ∪ B, where
A =
{
|〈wˆ, νw〉 − ‖νw‖2| 6 σL‖νw‖
√
2 log(2/δ1)
n
}
, B = {|‖wˆ− νw‖
∣∣ 6 γ}, then with probability P(E),
we have
P
( wˆ>
‖wˆ‖(φ(z)− bˆ) 6 εL1
‖wˆ‖q
‖wˆ‖
∣∣∣E) 6 P( wˆ>νw‖νw‖+ γ 6 t+ εL1 ‖wˆ‖q‖wˆ‖
∣∣∣E)+ 2 exp(− t2
2σ2L2
)
6 P
( wˆ>νw
‖νw‖+ γ 6 t+ εL1
√
d
∣∣∣E)+ 2 exp(− t2
2σ2L2
).
We still choose
δ = 2 exp(−(L˜/L)2d), δ1 = 2 exp(− d
8σ2L2
)
such that
γ = 2
√
2cσL˜
√
d
n
.
As a result, we obtain
|〈wˆ, νw〉 − ‖νw‖2| 6 d
2
√
n
, |‖wˆ − νw‖
∣∣ 6 2√2cσL˜√d
n
with probability at least 1− δ1 − δ. We choose t such that
wˆ>νw
‖νw‖+ γ > t+ εL1
√
d.
We let
t =
(
√
d)2 − d/(2√n)
√
d/2 + 2
√
2cσL˜
√
d
n
− εL1
√
d =
√
d(
√
n− 1/2)√
n/2 + 2
√
2cσL˜
− εL1
√
d.
As long as
ε 6 (
√
n− 1/2√
n/2 + 2
√
2cσL˜
− σL
√
2 log(1/β)√
d
)/L1,
we have
βR(wˆ, bˆ) 6 2 exp(− t
2
2σ2L2
) 6 β
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A.4 Statistical Measures
Recall the definition of
dν = max
{‖µ˜1 − µ1‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ ,
‖µ˜2 − µ2‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖
}
.
We now make connections to commonly used statistical measures and provide a sketch of proof.
(a). Wasserstein Distance: the Wasserstein Distance induced by metric ρ between distributions
P1 and P2 over Rd is defined as
Wρ(P1,P2) = sup
‖f‖Lip61
[
∫
fdP1 − fdP2],
where ‖f‖Lip 6 1 indicates the class of f : Rd 7→ R such that for any x, x′ ∈ Rd, |f(x) − f(x)| 6
ρ(x, x′). Let us consider ρ(x, x′) = ‖x− x′‖.
Proposition A.1. Suppose max{Wρ(P1, P˜1),Wρ(P2, P˜2)} 6 τ , for τ > 0, then we have ‖µi−µ˜i‖ 6
τ, i = 1, 2. As a result,
dν 6
τ
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ .
If we further have τ 6 ‖µ1 − µ2‖/2, we have dν 6 τ/(‖µ1 − µ2‖ − 2τ).
Proof. Notice f(x) = x also satisfies ‖f‖Lip 6 1, then we know ‖µi − µ˜i‖ 6 τ, i = 1, 2. If we
further have τ 6 ‖µ1 − µ2‖/2, plugging into the denominator, the result follows.
(b). Maximal Information: Maximal Information between distributions P1 and P2 over Rd is
defined as
MI(P1,P2) = sup
O⊆Rd
max
{
Px∼P1(x ∈ O)
Px∼P2(x ∈ O)
,
Px∼P2(x ∈ O)
Px∼P1(x ∈ O)
}
.
Proposition A.2. Suppose max{MI(P1, P˜1),MI(P2, P˜2)} 6 τ for 1 6 τ 6 1+‖µ1−µ2‖/(2‖µ1‖+
2‖µ2‖), then we have ‖µi − µ˜i‖ 6 (τ − 1)‖µi‖, i = 1, 2. As a result, we have
dν 6
(τ − 1) max{‖µ1‖, ‖µ2‖}
‖µ1 − µ2‖ − 2(τ − 1)(‖µ1‖+ ‖µ2‖) .
As we can see, as τ → 1, dν → 0.
Proof. Let X1 ∼ P1, X2 ∼ P2. By the definition of Maximal Information,
sup
x∈Rd
max
{
P(X1 = x)
P(X2 = x)
,
P(X2 = x)
P(X1 = x)
}
6 τ.
Then, we know ‖µi − µ˜i‖ 6 (τ − 1)‖µi‖, i = 1, 2 once we notice for all corresponding entries of the
vector of X1 and X2, their maximal information is bounded by τ. So,
dν 6
(τ − 1) max{‖µ1‖, ‖µ2‖}
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ .
If we further have τ 6 1 + ‖µ1 − µ2‖/(2‖µ1‖ + 2‖µ2‖), plugging into the denominator, the result
follows.
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(c). H-Divergence: let H be a class of binary classifiers, then H-divergence between distributions
P and P ′ over Rd is defined as
DH(P,P ′) = sup
h∈H
|Px∼P(h(x) = 1)− Px∼P ′(h(x) = 1)|.
To illustrate the connection between Theorem 3.3 and H-divergence, we consider a specific hypoth-
esis class
H = {h|h(t) = sgn(w>(t− b)), (w, b) ∈ Rd × Rd}. (3)
Proposition A.3. Suppose for Xi ∼ Pi and X˜i ∼ P˜i i = 1, 2, the sub-gaussian norm of ‖Xi−µi‖ψ2
and ‖X˜i − µ˜i‖ψ2 are bounded by σ and σ˜, where Xi ∼ Pi, X˜i ∼ P˜i and µi, µ˜i are the corresponding
means. Let α = ζ
√
log(4/(1− τ)), where ζ = max{σ, σ˜}, if max{DH(P1, P˜1), DH(P2, P˜2)} 6 τ,
for τ 6 1, we have ‖µi − µ˜i‖ 6 α, i = 1, 2. As a result,
dν 6
α
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ .
If we further have τ 6 1− 4 exp(−‖µ1 − µ2‖2/4ζ2), then dν 6 α/(‖µ1 − µ2‖ − 2α).
Proof. It follows a simple geometric argument – a hyperplane cannot distinguish the two distribu-
tions too well. Recall if ‖Xi − µi‖ψ2 6 σi and ‖X˜i − µ˜i‖ψ2 6 σ˜i, then for i = 1, 2
P(‖Xi − µi‖ > t) 6 2 exp(− t
2
σ2
), P(‖X˜i − µ˜i‖ > t) 6 2 exp(− t
2
σ˜2
)
Consider t∗ such that
2 exp(− t
∗2
ζ2
) = (1− τ)/2, i.e. t∗ = α/2.
It is easy to see the distance ‖(µ1−µ2)/2−(µ˜1− µ˜2)/2‖ should be upper bounded by 2t∗, otherwise,
there exists a hyperplane such that the probability mass of X1 ∼ P1 and X˜1 ∼ P˜1 has high
probability mass on difference side of the hyperplane.
As we can see in the case for Wasserstein Distance, as τ → 0, dν → 0. However, forH-Divergence
when τ → 0, dν will not go to 0. That is due to the constraint of capacity of H. Even if τ = 0, Pi
and P˜i can still be quite different.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Let us recall the statement of Theorem 3.3 with some specified constants.
Theorem A.1 (Robust accuracy). Consider the Gaussian generative model, where the marginal
distribution of the input x of labeled domain is a uniform mixture of two distributions with mean µ1 =
E[φ(z)] and µ2 = E[φ(−z)] respectively, where z ∼ N (0, σ2Is1). Suppose the marginal distribution
of the input of unlabeled domain is a mixture of two sub-gaussian distributions with mean µ˜1 and µ˜2
with mixing probabilities q and 1 − q and ∥∥E [ϑ(x˜i)− E[ϑ(x˜i)] | aTϑ(x˜i) = b]∥∥ ≤ cε · (√d + |b|) for
fixed unit vector a. Assuming the sub-gaussian norm for both labeled and unlabeled data are upper
bounded by a universal quantity σmax := Cσd1/4, cq < q < 1 − cq, ‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖2 = Cµ
√
d, for some
constants Cσ > 0,0 < cq < 1/2, Cµ > 0 sufficiently large, and
dν = max
{‖µ˜1 − µ1‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖ ,
‖µ˜2 − µ2‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖
}
< c0,
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for some constant c0 ≤ 1/4, then the robust classification error is at most 1% when d is sufficiently
large, n ≥ C for some constant C (not depending on d and ε) and
n˜ & ε2 log d
√
d.
Now let us proceed to the proof.
For simplicity of presentation. We first denote the distributions for the two classes of la-
beled data as subGaussian(µ1, σ2max), and subGaussian(µ2, σ2max) respectively. Similarly, we also
denote the distributions for the two classes of unlabeled data as subGaussian(µ˜1, σ2max), and
subGaussian(µ˜2, σ
2
max) respectively. Also, to avoid the visual similarity and emphasize the esti-
mates constructed by the labeled and unlabeled data respectively, we write wˆ as wˆintermediate, bˆ as
bˆintermediate, w˜ as w˜final and b˜ as b˜final.
Then, let us write out the robust error of misclassifying class 1 against the `∞ attack (the robust
error of misclassifying class 2 can be bounded similarly) as
max
‖δ‖∞≤L′1ε
P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(x˜+ δ − b˜final) 6 0 | x˜ ∼ subGaussian(µ˜1, σ
2
max)
)
=P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 −
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(µ1 − b˜final) + ε
‖w˜final‖1
‖w˜final‖
)
=P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 −
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(µ1 − b˜final) + L
′
1 · ε
√
d
)
Denote b˜final := µ˜1+µ˜22 + db, we then have
P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 −
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(µ1 − b˜final) + L
′
1 · ε
√
d
)
=P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 −
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖((µ1 − µ˜1) +
µ˜1 − µ˜2
2
− db) + L′1 · ε
√
d
)
We are going to bound | w˜>final‖w˜final‖(µ1 − µ˜1)|, |
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(µ˜1 − µ˜2)/2|, and |
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖db| respectively.
Let µ˜ = (µ˜1− µ˜2)/2, ν˜ = (µ˜1 + µ˜2)/2, µ = (µ1−µ2)/2, ν = (µ1 +µ2)/2, and bi be the indicator
that the ith pseudo-label y˜i is incorrect, so that x˜i ∼ ν˜ + subGaussian
(
(1− 2bi) y˜iµ˜, σ2
)
Let n˜1 =
∑n˜
i=1 1{y˜i = 1}, n˜2 =
∑n˜
i=1 1{y˜i = −1}. We recall the final direction estimator as
w˜final =
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
x˜i − 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
x˜i
=
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi) µ˜+ 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi) µ˜− 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi,
where εi ∼ subGaussian
(
0, σ2
)
independent of each other.
Now let
γ :=
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi) + 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi) ,
and define
δ˜ := w˜final − γµ˜ = 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi − 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi.
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We then have the decomposition and bound
‖w˜final‖2
(µ˜>w˜final)
2 =
∥∥∥δ˜ + γµ˜∥∥∥2(
γ ‖µ˜‖2 + µ˜>δ˜
)2 = 1‖µ˜‖2 +
∥∥∥δ˜ + γµ˜∥∥∥2 − 1‖µ˜‖2 (γ ‖µ˜‖2 + µ˜>δ˜)2(
γ ‖µ˜‖2 + µ˜>δ˜
)2
=
1
‖µ˜‖2 +
‖δ˜‖2 − 1‖µ˜‖2
(
µ˜>δ˜
)2
(
γ ‖µ˜‖2 + µ˜>δ˜
)2 ≤ 1‖µ˜‖2 + ‖δ˜‖2‖µ˜‖4 (γ + 1‖µ˜‖2 µ˜>δ˜)2 . (4)
To write down concentration bounds for ‖δ˜‖2 and µ˜>δ˜ we must address their sub-Gaussianity.
To do so, write
δ˜ =
1
2
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)εi − 1
2
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = −1)
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = −1)εi,
and
y˜i
i.i.d.∼ sign
(
(ziµ˜+ ν˜ − bˆintermediate + εi)>wˆintermediate
)
,
y˜iεi
i.i.d.∼ sign
(
(ziµ˜+ ν˜ − b˜intermediate + εi)>wˆintermediate
)
· εi,
where zi is the true label of x˜i (taken value from ±1).
We then have
E[1(y˜i = 1)] =P((ziµ˜+ ν˜ − b˜intermediate + εi)>wˆintermediate > 0)
=
1
2
P((µ˜1 − b˜intermediate + εi)>wˆintermediate > 0) + 1
2
P((µ˜2 − b˜intermediate + εi)>wˆintermediate > 0)
=
1
2
P((µ˜1 − µ1 + µ2
2
+ eb + εi)
>wˆintermediate > 0) +
1
2
P((µ˜2 − µ1 + µ2
2
+ eb + εi)
>wˆintermediate > 0)
≥1
2
P((µ˜1 − µ1 + µ2
2
+ eb)
>wˆintermediate + ε>i wˆintermediate > 0)
=
1
2
P(ε>i wˆintermediate > −(µ˜1 − µ1 +
µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>wˆintermediate)
The term in the last line can be bounded as follows. Let us recall dν = max
{‖µ˜1−µ1‖
‖µ˜1−µ˜2‖ ,
‖µ˜2−µ2‖
‖µ˜1−µ˜2‖
}
<
c0 implies that ‖µ˜− µ‖ < c0‖µ˜‖, and therefore ‖µ‖ ≥ ‖µ˜‖ − c0‖µ˜‖ = (1− c0)‖µ˜‖. We then obtain
|(µ˜1 − µ1)>µ| ≤ ‖µ˜1 − µ1‖ · ‖µ‖ ≤ c0‖µ˜‖ · ‖µ‖ ≤ c0
1− c0 ‖µ‖
2.
As a result, we have
|(µ˜1 − µ1 + µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>wˆintermediate| =|(µ˜1 − µ1 + µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>(µ+ ew)|
≥‖µ‖2 − |(µ˜1 − µ1)>µ| − |e>b µ| − |(µ˜1 − µ1 +
µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>ew|
&Ωp(
√
d).
We then have
E[1(y˜i = 1)] ≥1
2
P(ε>i wˆintermediate > −(µ˜1 − µ1 +
µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>wˆintermediate)
≥1
2
P(ε>i
µ1 − µ2
2
> 0) ≥ c
2
, (5)
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for some constant c close to 1 when d is sufficiently large.
Therefore, we have
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1) ≥ c+ op(1),
and
‖ 1∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)εi‖ . ‖ 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)εi‖
In addition, we have
‖E[1(y˜i = 1)εi]‖ = ‖E[E[1(y˜i = 1)εi | wˆintermediateεi]]‖ ≤ E[
√
d+ |wˆintermediateεi]|] .
√
d.
Since ‖1(y˜i = 1)ε(j)i − E[1(y˜i = 1)ε(j)i ]‖ψ2 ≤ 2‖1(y˜i = 1)ε(j)i ‖ψ2 ≤ C‖ε(j)i ‖ψ2 ≤ Cσmax, we have
P
( 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)ε
(j)
i
)2
≥ (E[1(y˜i = 1)ε(j)i ])2 + t2 · σ2max
 ≤ e−Cn˜t2 .
Therefore, by union bound, with probability at least 1− d−1,
‖ 1∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)εi‖2 . ‖ 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)εi‖2 =
d∑
j=1
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)ε
(j)
i
)2
. d+d· log d
n˜
σ2max.
Similarly, we have
‖ 1∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = −1)
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = −1)εi‖2 . ‖ 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = −1)εi‖2 =
d∑
j=1
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = −1)ε(j)i
)2
. d+d· log d
n˜
σ2max.
Then, since ‖δ˜‖2 ≤ ‖ 1
2
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i=1)
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)εi‖2 + ‖ 12∑n˜i=1 1(y˜i=−1)
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = −1)εi‖2, we
have
‖δ˜‖2 = Op(d · (1 + log d
n˜
σ2)).
The same technique also yields a crude bound on µ˜>δ˜ = 12n˜1
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)µ˜
>εi− 12n˜2
∑
i=1 1(y˜i =
−1)µ˜>εi. We can write
1(y˜i = 1)µ˜
>εi
i.i.d.∼ 1
(
(ziµ˜+ ν˜ − bˆintermediate + εi)>wˆintermediate > 0
)
· µ˜>εi.
Since ‖1(y˜i = 1)µ˜>εi‖ϑ2 ≤ C‖µ˜>ε(j)i ‖ϑ2 ≤ C‖µ˜‖2σ, we have
P
( 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
1(y˜i = 1)µ˜
>εi
)2
≥ t2 · ‖µ˜‖2σ2 + ‖µ˜‖2σ2
 ≤ e−Cn˜t2 .
and by the fact that
(
1
n˜1
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)µ˜
>εi
)2
.
(
1
n˜
∑n˜
i=1 1(y˜i = 1)µ˜
>εi
)2
, we have
P
(∣∣∣µ˜>δ˜∣∣∣ ≥ √2σ ‖µ˜‖+ ‖µ˜‖σ) = P(∣∣∣µ˜>δ˜∣∣∣2 ≥ Cσ2 ‖µ˜‖2) ≤ e−n˜/8.
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Finally, we need to argue that γ is not too small. Recall that γ = 12n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi)+ 12n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1 (1− 2bi)
where bi is the indicator that y˜i is incorrect and therefore
E [1− 2bi | wˆintermediate, y˜i = 1] = 1− 2P(fwˆintermediate | x˜ ∼ subGaussian(µ˜1, σ2))
= 2P(ε>i wˆintermediate > −(µ˜1 − µ1 +
µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>wˆintermediate)− 1.
This term can be lower bounded similarly as (5), which satisfies
E [1− 2bi | wˆintermediate, y˜i = 1]
=2P(ε>i wˆintermediate > −(µ˜1 − µ1 +
µ1 − µ2
2
+ eb)
>wˆintermediate)− 1 ≥ 4
5
,
with high probability when d is sufficiently large.
Similarly, we have
E [1− 2bi | wˆintermediate, y˜i = −1] ≥ 4
5
,
with high probability when d is sufficiently large.
Therefore we expect γ to be reasonably large as long as E[γ] ≥ 45 . Indeed, define
γ˜ =
1
n˜
n∑
i=1
(1− 2bi).
We then have
E[γ˜] ≥E[ 1
n˜
∑
yi=1
(1− 2bi) + 1
n˜
∑
yi=−1
(1− 2bi)]
≥E[ 1
n˜
· 4
5
n˜1 +
1
n˜
· 4
5
n˜2] ≥ 4
5
.
By using γ ≥ 12 γ˜, we have
P(γ ≥ 1
5
) ≥ P(γ˜ ≥ 2
5
) = 1− P(γ˜ < 2
5
)
≥1− P(|γ˜ − E[γ˜]| > 2
5
) ≥ 1− e−cn˜,
where the last inequality is due to Hoeffding’s inequality.
As a result, we have γ ≥ 25 with high probability.
Define the event,
E =
{
‖δ˜‖2 ≤ ‖γ(‖µ‖‖µ˜‖ µ˜− µ)‖
2 +
d · σ2max
n˜
log d+ dξ2n,
∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣ ≤ √2σmax ‖µ‖+ γµ>(‖µ‖‖µ˜‖ µ˜− µ) + ξn‖µ‖ and γ ≥ 25
}
;
by the preceding discussion,
P
(EC) ≤ 1
d
+ e−n˜/8 + e−c‖µ‖
2/8σ2max + 2e−cn‖µ‖/2σmax + e−cn˜
Moreover, by the bound (4), E implies
‖w˜final‖2
(µ˜>w˜final)
2 ≤
1
‖µ˜‖2 +
‖δ˜‖2
‖µ˜‖4
(
γ + 1‖µ˜‖2 µ˜
>δ˜
)2 ≤ 1‖µ˜‖2 + d · (1 +
log d
n˜ σ
2
max)
‖µ˜‖4
(
2
5 +
1
‖µ˜‖2 · ‖µ˜‖σmax
)2 .
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Therefore,
µ˜>w˜final
σmax ‖w˜final‖ ≥
σ2max‖µ˜‖2 + d · (1 +
log d
n˜ σ
2
max)
‖µ˜‖4
(
2
5 − σmax‖µ˜‖2
)2

−1/2
with probability ≥ 1− (1d + e−n˜/8 + e−c‖µ‖
2/8σ2max + 2e−cn‖µ‖/2σmax).
Recall that we take σmax := Cσd1/4 and ‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖2 = Cµ
√
d for sufficiently large Cµ, we than
have when n˜ & ε2d log d,
µ˜>w˜final
‖w˜final‖ = ΩP (
√
d).
Then let us consider
bˆfinal =
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
x˜i +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
x˜i
=ν˜ +
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi) µ˜− 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi) µ˜+ 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi
=ν˜ +
 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi)− 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi)
 µ˜+ 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi,
Let
λ :=
1
n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi)− 1
n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi)
When n > C for sufficiently large C, we have λ ≤ 0.01.
Also, let us denote δ˜2 = 12n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1 εi, we then have
|δ˜>δ˜2| = ‖ 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi‖2 − ‖ 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi‖2 ≤ ‖ 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi‖2 ≤ cε(d+ d · log d
n˜
σ2max)
We also have
| w˜
>
final
‖w˜final‖db| ≤λ|
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ µ˜|+ |
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ δ˜2|
≤λ‖µ˜‖+ |(δ˜ + γµ˜)
>
‖δ˜ + γµ˜‖ δ˜2|
≤λ‖µ˜‖+ |δ˜
>δ˜2 + γµ˜>δ˜2|
‖γµ˜‖ − ‖δ˜‖
≤λ‖µ˜‖+ cε(d+ d ·
log d
n˜ σ
2) +OP (‖µ˜‖σ)
γ‖µ˜‖ − cε(d+ d · log dn˜ σ2)
≤(λCµ + cε
γCµ − cε ) ·
√
d
22
Therefore, when the constant Cµ is sufficiently large,
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖((µ1 − µ˜1) +
µ˜1 − µ˜2
2
− db)
≥| w˜
>
final
‖w˜final‖ µ˜| − |
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(µ1 − µ˜1)| − |
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖db|
≥
 σ2‖µ˜‖2 + d · (1 +
log d
n˜ σ
2
max)
‖µ˜‖4
(
1
6 − σmax‖µ˜‖2
)2

−1/2
− 2c0‖µ˜‖ − (λCµ + cε
γCµ − cε ) ·
√
d
=ΩP (
√
d).
The robust error is then
P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 −
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(µ1 − bˆ) + L
′
1 · ε
√
d
)
=P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 −
w˜>final
‖w˜final‖((µ1 − µ˜1) +
µ˜1 − µ˜2
2
− db) + L′1 · ε
√
d
)
≤ exp(−C
√
d) ≤ 0.01,
when d is sufficiently large.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Let us consider the following modelr: x ∼ N(yµ, σ2I) with y uniform on {−1, 1} and µ ∈ Rd.
Consider a linear classifier fw(x) = sgn(x>w).
It’s easy to see that the robust error probability is
err∞robust(f) = Q(
µ>w
σ‖w‖ −
ε‖w‖1
σ‖w‖ ),
where Q = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x e
−t2/2 dt.
Therefore
argmin‖w‖=1 err
∞
robust(fw) = argmax‖w‖=1
µ>w
σ‖w‖ −
ε‖w‖1
σ‖w‖
= argmax‖w‖=1 µ
>w − ε‖w‖1
= argmax‖w‖=1
d∑
j=1
µjwj − ε|wj |
By observation, when reaching maximum, we have to have sgn(wj) = sgn(µj), therefore
argmax‖w‖=1
d∑
j=1
µjwj − ε|wj |
= argmax‖w‖=1
d∑
j=1
(µj − ε · sgn(µj))wj
=
Tε(µ)
‖Tε(µ)‖ ,
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where Tε(µ) is the hard-thresholding operator with (Tε(µ))j = sgn(µj) ·max{|µj | − ε, 0}.
Now let us consider the example: µ with µj > ε for all j = 1, 2, ...d. For the shifted domain, we
let µ˜1 = −µ˜2 = µ˜ = µ− ε · 1p, and the mixing proportion is half-half.
Let bi be the indicator that the ith pseudo-label y˜i = sgn(x˜>i wˆintermediate) is incorrect, so that
x˜i ∼ N
(
(1− 2bi) y˜iµ˜, σ2I
)
, and let
γ :=
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
(1− 2bi) ∈ [−1, 1].
We may write the final direction estimator as
w˜final =
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜ix˜i = γµ˜+
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεi
where εi ∼ N
(
0, σ2I
)
independent of each other.
By orthogonal invariance of Gaussianality, we choose a coordinate system such that the first
coordinate is in the direction of wˆintermediate, we then have
‖ 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεi‖22 =|
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεi1|22 +
d∑
j=2
| 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεij |22
≤σ
2
n˜
χ2n˜ +
σ2
n˜
χ2d−1.
In addition, we have ‖µ˜‖22 = dε2. Therefore, if (1/d+ 1/n˜) · σ
2
ε2
→ 0, we will then have
w˜final
‖w˜final‖ → µ˜,
and therefore
err∞robust(fwˆfinal) ≤ err∞robust(fµ).
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Suppose the labeled domain distribution is 12N(µ, σ
2Ip) +
1
2N(−µ, σ2Ip). Let v ∈ Rp be a vector
such that v>µ = 0, ‖µ‖ = a‖v‖ for some a > 0, and let the unlabeled domain distribution be
1
2N(v, σ
2Ip) +
1
2N(−v, σ2Ip). That is, µ1 = −µ2 = µ, µ˜1 = −µ˜2 = v.
We then have
dν = max{|‖µ˜1 − µ1‖‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖|,
‖µ˜2 − µ2‖
‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖|} =
√
1 + a2 · ‖v‖
2‖v‖ =
√
1 + a2 · ‖µ˜1 − µ˜2‖
2
,
which falls into the specified class.
Now let us consider the case where µ = e1, v = a−1e2, where e1, e2 are the canonical basis, and
study the performance of the classifier sgn(w˜>final(z − bˆ)), where
bˆfinal =
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
x˜i +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
x˜i; w˜final =
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
x˜i − 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
x˜i.
Similar to the proof in the last section, let bi be the indicator that y˜i is incorrect and we
decompose w˜final and bˆ into
24
w˜final =
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
x˜i − 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
x˜i
=
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi) v + 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi) v − 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi,
bˆfinal =
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
x˜i +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
x˜i
=
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
(1− 2bi) µ˜− 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
(1− 2bi) µ˜+ 1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi.
Now let us investigate bi carefully. When y˜i = 1, we have
E[bi | y˜i = 1] = P(x˜ ∼ subGaussian(µ˜1, σ2) | (x˜− bˆintermediate)>wˆintermediate > 0)
=
P((x˜− bˆintermediate)>wˆintermediate > 0) | x˜ ∼ subGaussian(µ˜1, σ2)
P((x˜− bˆintermediate)>wˆintermediate > 0) | x˜ ∼ (µ˜1, σ2)) + P((x˜− bˆintermediate)>wˆintermediate > 0) | x˜ ∼ (µ˜2, σ2))
=
1
2
+Op(
√
d
n
).
As a result, we have
w˜final = (Op(
√
d
n
) +Op(
√
1
n˜
))v +
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi − 1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi;
bˆfinal = (Op(
√
d
n
) +Op(
√
1
n˜
))v +
1
2n˜1
∑
y˜i=1
εi +
1
2n˜2
∑
y˜i=−1
εi.
Then let us study εi | y˜i = 1. When y˜i = 1, we have
(x˜− bˆintermediate)>wˆintermediate > 0.
Recall that µ = e1, v = a−1e2 the inequality is equivalent to
〈e1, εi〉+OP (
√
d
n
) > 0.
and put no constraint on other coordinates. Similarly, when y˜i = −1, we have
〈e1, εi〉+OP (
√
d
n
) < 0,
and put no constraint on other coordinates.
As a result, we have
w˜final
‖w˜final‖2 = (Op(
√
d
n
) +Op(
√
1
n˜
))v + e1;
bˆfinal = (Op(
√
d
n
) +Op(
√
1
n˜
))v +Op(
√
d
n˜
).
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Then we write out the misclassification error
P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖(x˜− bˆ) 6 0 | x˜ ∼ subGaussian(v, σ
2)
)
= P
( w˜>final
‖w˜final‖ε 6 Op(
√
d
n˜
) +Op(
√
d
n
)
)
=1/2 +Op(
√
d
n˜
) +Op(
√
d
n
).
Therefore, when dn and
d
n˜ sufficiently small, we then have
βε,∞(w˜, b˜) ≥ β∞(w˜, b˜) ≥ 49%.
A.8 The high-dimensional EM algorithm mentioned in the main paper
The algorithm used in the main paper to extract the support information from the unlabeled domain
is presented in the following in Algorithm 1, which is adapted from [6].
A.9 Proof of Theorem 3.6
Let us first adapt the Theorem 3.1 in [6], which states the convergence rate of Algorithm 1
Lemma A.4 (adapted from Theorem 3.1 in [6]). Under the same conditions of Theorem 3.6, if we
choose the initializations of Algorithm 1 according to [17]. Then there is a constant κ ∈ (0, 1), such
that the estimator βˆ(T0) satisfies
‖βˆ(T0) − (µ˜1 − µ˜2)‖2 . κT0 · (‖βˆ(0) − (µ˜1 − µ˜2)‖2 + |ωˆ(0) − q|) + σ
√
m log d
n˜
.
In particular, if we let T0 & (− log(κ))−1 log(n · (‖βˆ(0) − (µ˜1 − µ˜2)‖2 + |ωˆ(0) − q|)), we have
‖βˆ(T0) − (µ˜1 − µ˜2)‖2 . σ
√
m log d
n˜
.
As a direct consequence of Lemma A.4, we have
‖βˆ(T0) − (µ˜1 − µ˜2)‖∞ . σ
√
m log d
n˜
.
Using the condition that minµ˜1,j−µ˜2j 6=0 |µ˜1j − µ˜2,j | ≥ Cσ
√
2m log d/n˜ for sufficiently large C, we
then have, with high probability,
Sˆ = Supp(βˆ(T0)) = Supp(µ˜1 − µ˜2).
Therefore, when we project the labeled data to this support Sˆ, it reduce the model to the previous
setting considered in Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 with the dimension of ν(x˜) reduced to m. Combing the
proofs of Theorem 3.1, 3.2, and 3,3m we then have the desired result that if n & ε2 log d√m, we
have
βε,∞(wˆsparse, bˆsparse) ≤ 10−3 +OP ( 1
n
+
1
d
).
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Algorithm 1 Clustering of HIgh-dimensional Gaussian Mixtures with the EM (CHIME)
1: Inputs: Initializations ωˆ(0), µˆ(0)1 , and µˆ
(0)
2 , maximum number of iterations T0, and a constant
κ ∈ (0, 1). Set
βˆ(0) = argminβ∈Rp
{
1
2
‖β‖2 − β>(µˆ(0)1 − µˆ(0)2 ) + λ(0)n ‖β‖1
}
,
where the tuning parameter λ(0)n = C1 · (|ωˆ| ∨ ‖µˆ(0)1 − µˆ(0)2 ‖2,s)/
√
s+ Cλ
√
log p/n.
2: for t = 0, 1, . . . , T0 − 1 do
3: Let
γθˆ(t)(x˜i) =
ωˆ(t)
ωˆ(t) + (1− ωˆ(t)) exp{((µˆ(t)2 − µˆ(t)1 ))>(x˜i − µˆ(t)1 +µˆ(t)22 )} .
4: Update ωˆ(t+1), µˆ(t+1)1 , and µˆ
(t+1)
2 , by
ωˆ(t+1) = ωˆ(θˆ(t)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
γθˆ(t)(x˜i),
µˆ
(t+1)
1 = µˆ1(θˆ
(t)) =
{
n−
n∑
i=1
γθˆ(t)(x˜i)
}−1{ n∑
i=1
(1− γθˆ(t)(x˜i))x˜i
}
,
µˆ
(t+1)
2 = µˆ2(θˆ
(t)) =
{ n∑
i=1
γθˆ(t)(x˜i)
}−1{ n∑
i=1
γθˆ(t)(x˜i)x˜i
}
,
and update βˆ(t+1) via
βˆ(t+1) = argminβ∈Rp
{
1
2
‖β‖2 − β>(µˆ(t+1)1 − µˆ(t+1)2 ) + λ(t+1)n ‖β‖1
}
,
with
λ(t+1)n = κλ
(t)
n + Cλ
√
log p
n
.
5: end for
6: Output the support of βˆ(T0), Sˆ = Supp(βˆ(T0)).
7: Project xi’s to Sˆ = Supp(βˆ(T0)), estimate wˆ and bˆ on these projected samples
8: Construct the classifier sgn(wˆ>(zSˆ)− bˆ)
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B Experimental Implementation on Synthetic Data
We here complement our theory result in Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.6 by experiments with
synthetic data.
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Figure 2: Error Difference vs ε: we use synthetic data described in Theorem 3.4, where the Error
Difference = Adversarial Error when Unlabeled Data from the Same Domain - Adversarial Error
when Unlabeled Data from the Shifted Domain. We can see that error difference is positive for all
the ε we take, which implies unlabeled data from a shifted domain works even better.
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Figure 3: Error Difference vs ε: we use gaussian synthetic data with sparsity structure, where we
create 100 dimensional Gaussian data for both original domain and shifted domain, and only the
first 10 coordinates matters (mean difference of positive and negative distribution of data from each
domain is non-zero for only the first 10 coordinates). The Error Difference = Adversarial Error with
Semi-supervised Learning Algorithm - Adversarial Error with Algorithm with Unknown Sparsity.
We can see that error difference is positive for all the ε we take, which implies our algorithm with
unknown sparsity works better when there is some common sparsity structure.
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C Experimental Implementation on Real Data
We use the implementation from [9] that can be accessed from https://github.com/yaircarmon/
semisup-adv
C.1 Experimental setup
We follow the implementation in [9] for our experiments:
C.1.1 CIFAR10
Architecture We use a Wide ResNet 28-10 [38] architecture.
Training hyperparemeters We use a batch size of 256 with SGD optimizer (along with Nesterov
momentum of 0.1). We use cosine learning rate annealing [25] with initial rate of 0.01 and no restarts.
The weight decay parameter is set to 0.0005. We define an epoch to be a pass over 50000 training
points. For normal training we run 200 epochs. For adversarial training and stability training we
run 100 and 400 epochs respectively.
Data Augmentation We do a 4-pixel random cropping and a random horizontal flip.
Adversarial attacks We use the recommended parameters in [9]. In test time, we run 40
iterations of projected gradient descent with step-size of 0.01 and do 5 restarts.
Stability training We et noise variance to σ = 0.25. In test time, we setN0 = 100 andN = 10000
with α = 0.001.
C.1.2 SVHN
We use similar parameters to CIFAR-10 except the following.
architecture We use a Wide ResNet 16-8.
Training hyper-parameters The same as CIFAR-10 except we use batch size of 128 and run
98k gradient steps for all models.
Data Augmentation We do not perfom any augmentation.
C.2 Cheap-10 dataset creation pipeline
To create the Cheap-10 dataset, for each CIFAR-10 class, we create 50 related keywords to search for
on Bing image search enginer. Using an existing image downloding API implementation 4, we were
able to download ∼ 1000 images for each key-word search. We use Bing image search enginerCIFAR-
10 dataset is made of 10 classes. For animal classes (bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse), our keyboards
were made of names of different breeds and different colors or adjectives known to accompany the
specific animal. For instance, Parasitic Jaeger, Scottish Fold cat, Pygmy Brocket Deer, Spinone
Italiano Dog, Northern Leopard Frog, and Belgian Horse. For other classes (airplane, automobile,
4https://github.com/hardikvasa/google-images-download
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ship, truck), we search for different brands or classes. For example, Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor,
Renault automobile, Tanker ship, and Citroën truck. We then downsize images to the original
CIFAR-10 size of 32x32. We show example images of the dataset compared to CIFAR-10 images in
Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Cheap-10 examples Each row shows 10 examples of Cheap-10 dataset.
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